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THE TAX-TRANSPARENT ENTITY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS
Richard M. Buxbaum*
WO disputes of fairly recent vintage by a German individual sub-
ject and a U.S.-incorporated entity with their respective countries'
tax authorities prompt this brief exploration of some current ver-
sions of partnership-like legal issues-issues in which Alan Bromberg
long was interested. In the first case, a German resident asked to be
taxed on a pass-through basis for the distribution booked to him in conse-
quence of his membership in a U.S. (Delaware) limited liability com-
pany.1 In the second, the German tax authority required a traditional
German analogy to a limited liability company-a GmbH 2 -to apply a
15% withholding rate on a dividend distribution made to a U.S. S Corpo-
ration that held 50% of the membership units of the GmbH.3 The Ger-
man tax office claimed that not the S corporation but its shareholders
were the (beneficial) owners of the company and, as individuals, could
not benefit from the reduced withholding tax rate the treaty specified for
distributions to U.S. corporate owners of these GmbH membership
units. 4
To discuss these disputes, I begin with a brief look at the origins and
fate of the pass-through (or flow-through) concepts on the basis of which
these disputes arose.
I. FROM LARSON TO "CHECK-THE-BOX"
Those of us who, like Alan Bromberg, taught the Partnership Law
course out of necessity had to deal with the economic motivations deter-
mining the choice of organizational form, and that meant dealing with the
dreaded subject of tax law.5 Fortunately, the basic context was relatively
* Jackson H. Ralston Professor of International Law, emeritus, School of Law
(Boalt Hall), University of California at Berkeley. I owe many thanks to Dr. Friedrich Hey,
LLM (Berkeley) and Friedhelm Jacob (Hengeler Mueller, Frankfurt) and my colleague
Mark Gergen for their painstaking effort steer me through the intricacies of this subject.
All remaining errors are mine alone.
1. See explanation infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
2. In the context of tax-transparent entities, a rough analogy to the LLC. Id.
3. See discussion infra note 42. This was, of course, an issue under the applicable
bilateral Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, and will be explored below.
4. Id.
5. If General Ulysses Grant knew only two pieces of music-one was Yankee Doodle
and the other was not-then, at one time, law teachers knew only two fields of law-one
was tax law and the other was not. Today's law curricula suggest more cross-fertilization.
SMU LAW REVIEW
straightforward 6" the investor whose financial situation was such as to
benefit from the start-up losses incurred by the investment vehicle (and
eventually to exit a profitable venture at the lowest available rate of taxa-
tion) preferred, and indeed required, a tax-transparent vehicle. It had to
be an entity whose profit and loss flows passed directly to its owners. The
tax authorities permitted this transparency, but only on the condition that
the entity did not evidence a majority of so-called "associational" charac-
teristics. By 1970, those characteristics had been fixed as involving four
criteria: limitation of owners' personal liability for the entity's debts; cen-
tralization of management of the entity; indefinite duration of the entity;
and free transferability of units of ownership by its owners. If a majority
of these attributes existed, the entity had associational status, and as such
was itself the location of the incidents of direct taxation. Larson then set
the parameters: If no more than two existed, the entity was transparent,
and the incidents of direct taxation flowed through to its owners.
So far, so good. But two conflicting considerations increased in salience
as these entities grew in size and thus in the number of owners. Not the
general but the limited partnership was the arena of this conflict. It was
the ideal vehicle to gather significant amounts of capital for increasingly
significant types of investment activity, and it limited the right of the
providers of this passive capital, the limited partners, to participate in the
management and governance of the entity. The private conflicting consid-
eration was the need for limited partners to be able to exit. The public
consideration was the impact of state and federal securities regulation not
only on the adequate disclosure of the conditions of investment but
also-especially at the state level-on the provision of a minimal amount
of "voice" to these limited partners.
The first difficulty under this new participatory regime of course was
not specifically with the "centralization of management" associational at-
tribute; on the contrary, the more voice allotted to limited partners, the
less likely should have been the ascription of associational status as to
that component. The conflict, rather, was with the traditional require-
ment of earlier state law that the limited liability of the limited partners
came at the price of non-participation in management. This, in turn, did
mean that the associational attribute of centralized management re-
mained an issue of concern whenever the financial interests of some or all
of the limited partners required them to get involved with the business
decisions of the entity.
That traditional constraint was loosened by the 1970s through the in-
troduction into the limited partnership statutes of so-called "safe harbor"
participatory rights (and it is worth noting that California was most active
6. At least once the era launched by the seminal case of Larson v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 159(A) (1976), arrived (acquiesced, 1979-2 C.B. 1 (IRS ACQ), 1979 WL 194005). 1 do
not discuss here the earlier position of the Treasury, under the original Kintner regulations,
which tried to impose partnership status on professional entities in order to control the use
of tax-deferred income for qualified retirement plans by these entities that were prohibited
under state law from incorporation.
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in insisting on this change, even at the potential cost to the desirable uni-
form law approach that facilitated multi-state, public entities and thus ec-
onomic growth). 7 The IRS, however, did not automatically find
centralization of management lacking just because the safe harbor ap-
proach mitigated the risk that safe harbor-based behavior might lead to
personal liability of these limited partners. And since the larger these en-
tities, the more clearly some of the other three attributes-liquidity, dura-
tion, and liability-might be deemed to evince associational attributes,
the fate of the limited partnership remained in contention.
In a way, the safe harbor provisions concerning limited partner partici-
pation in some aspects of management perversely heightened the risk
that associational status would be attributed to (the lack of) personal lia-
bility. In earlier times, slight missteps into the minefield of control quickly
brought personal liability in their wake. Now, between the safe harbor
catalogue and the umbrella safeguard clauses requiring third parties to
have known of a particular partner's behavior that went beyond the safe
harbor-and to have formed a reasonable belief that this behavior
equaled that of a general partner-personal liability became rare if not
practically impossible to demonstrate. 8 And the growth of the large lim-
ited partnership with a large number of passive investors meant that the
need of investors for liquidity and thus for transferability of ownership
interests became more important, more prevalent, and more "associa-
tional." In addition, indefinite continuity of life of course also became a
more desirable notion the larger the enterprise, and for essentially the
same reasons that led to the need for the transferability of interests.9
Now the pressure was on and, as is well known, the IRS yielded.
Check-the-box regulations arrived. They not only nurtured large-scale
limited partnerships, but also became the starting gun for the limited lia-
bility company,10 whose members enjoyed both the limited liability of the
traditional corporation and the pass-through tax privilege, no matter their
7. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15903.03 (West 2015).
8. Indeed, some states (fortunately, not the leading jurisdictions) have enacted
RULPA § 303 (2001), which eliminates any potential liability of a limited partner no mat-
ter the extent of that partner's participation in management and control activities.
9. Nothing new here. See M. Herberger, Das Inhaberpapier als spirituelle Dampfmas-
chine [The Bearer Instrument as the Spiritual Steam Engine [of Capitalism]], 1 RECHTSHIS-
TORISCHES JOURNAL 180 (1982).
10. While the first LLC statute, that of Wyoming, was enacted in 1977, only a decade
later was such an entity's tax-transparent nature fully accepted by the IRS with the adop-
tion of Revenue Ruling 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. See Carol Goforth, Why Limited Liability
Company Membership Interests Should Not be Treated as Securities and Possible Steps to
Encourage this Result, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1225 n.l (1994). Goforth notes:
This revenue ruling was issued only after a lengthy period of confusion about
how the IRS would regard LLCs. The IRS had issued a private letter ruling
in 1980 which concluded that a particular Wyoming LLC would be treated as
a partnership for tax purposes, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980), but
had also issued a private letter ruling in 1982 finding that another Wyoming





II. THE FOREIGN LLC MEMBER OF A TAX-TRANSPARENT
U.S. ENTITY AND THE U.S. MEMBER OF A GERMAN
TAX-TRANSPARENT ENTITY
This short essay does not enter the field of tax-avoidance planning,
which is where most of the professional literature (and regulatory treat-
ment) of cross-border situations suggested by this title is found.' 2 My aim
is far more limited; namely to the international conflict of laws context
that these two ideal types of situations create and on which, but only in a
limited fashion, bilateral treaties for the avoidance of double taxation
may bear. To further limit the discussion, I shall focus on only one cross-
border context: that of Germany and the United States.
A. THE GERMAN MEMBER OF A TRANSPARENT U.S. ENTITy
It always has been and, even in the era of Double Tax Conventions,
remains the case that the characterization of the nature of a foreign legal
entity for the purpose of identifying the appropriate tax regime to impose
on domestic subjects 13 who own equity interests 14 in that entity is for the
local law of the domestic subject to determine. The first case discussed
here is that of a German subject who holds an interest in a U.S. entity.15
The canonical conflicts rule was firmly emplaced already in 1930 in a de-
cision of the German Finance Supreme Court (Reichsfinanzhof).16 The
fact situation was complex and does not need description for present pur-
poses.17 Decisive was the question of whether a Venezuelan limited part-
11. Even if this involves its subjection to federal securities regulation regimes. For the
SEC's advice to counsel for LLCs registering securities for public issuance, see SEC Staff
Legal Bulletin No. 19 (CF) (Oct. 14, 2011), available at https://www.sec.gov.interpsilegal/
cfslb.19.htm. The income tax treatment of such public issuers of course is not uniform, as
the use of the exemption of even publicly held entities not carrying on an active trade or
business in certain "privileged" sectors demonstrates.
12. These issues are the subjects of current efforts of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) to recommend domestic law reforms preventing
tax avoidance schemes that result in "DD" (Double Deduction) or "D/NI" (Deduction/No
Income Tax) outcomes. See OECD (2014), Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch
Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing,
Paris. For a current comprehensive and somewhat critical evaluation, see Graeme Cooper,
Some Thoughts on the OECD's Recommendations on Hybrid Mismatches, 69 BULL. INT'L
TAX'N 6/7 (2015).
13. The specifics of "domestic"-whether citizenship or domicile, and their internal
distinctions depending on whether the domestic subject is a natural or legal person-are
discussed below.
14. Or-though I do not discuss this form of investment here--debt instruments,
though the debt-or-equity characterization under domestic law is an important subset of
the "hybrid mismatch" tax avoidance problem. For a typical discussion, again using Ger-
man law, see Marisa Lipp, The German Silent Partnership, 55 EuR. TAX'N 7 (2015).
15. See Federal Ministry of Finance Letter, infra note 24.
16. Reichsfinanzhof [RFH] [Finance Supreme Court] 73, Feb. 12, 1930 (Ger.).
17. The underlying issues in the case were timing matters (to which taxable year of the
taxpayer the distribution should be ascribed) and characterization of distributions in in-
come or capital terms.
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nership, a legal entity under both Venezuelan and German law, should be
subject to German corporate taxation or whether, "despite the fact that
the company is clothed in the form of a legal person, it is the individual
members that should be treated as co-venturers in the sense of [the Ger-
man law], with the consequence that their shares of the profit are directly
subject to the income-tax law."'18 A sophisticated functional approach to
the issue followed:
[Comparisons based on their respective purposes] can lead to a sen-
sible result if one undertakes an evaluation of the Venezuelan com-
pany in its totality, paying attention to its economic position and its
legal construction under Venezuelan law. If this results in a signifi-
cant correspondence with the structure and economic role of the
German commercial or limited partnership in the context of its treat-
ment in the [German] income and corporate taxation system of these
forms, then one has to treat the Venezuelan company in the same
fashion. For this comparison one has, in particular, to determine
whether the foreign company is closer to the type of a personal com-
pany or one based on shares .... In the first type, the person of the
member is primary. The members normally manage its business, are
personally liable, and cannot transfer their participation to third par-
ties. In the case of the share company, the relation of its members to
it is more impersonal. They are not personally liable to creditors,
may transfer their shares, and in their capacity as members, do not
normally participate in the company's management. 19
Applying these criteria to the specific case, the court found that the
personal attributes predominated, and thus called for pass-through in-
come tax treatment of the German member of the entity, even if Vene-
zuelan law called for the incidence of taxation to fall on the company.
This so-called functional approach has remained the basis of the con-
flict of laws treatment of the first of these two case studies, the tax treat-
ment of the German member of a foreign entity. A fair number of cases
of essentially similar import have been decided under the laws of the Fed-
eral Republic; thus, a few secondary references will suffice. 20 Interesting
for our purposes, of course, is the consequence of this form of the Ger-
man local-law rule to the modern context of the public limited partner-
ship and especially of the public limited liability company that now
dominates the United States scene. A recent German discussion illus-
trates today's context within the traditional local law approach.
The specific question is how the limited liability company is character-
ized for the purpose of the difference between the German treatment of
the "corporation" (Korperschaft) and the partnership (Personengesell-
18. 27 RFHE 73, 77 (Ger.) [author's translation].
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Friedrich Hey, Stellung der US (Delaware) Limited Liability Company im
internationalen Steuerrecht, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR HELMUT DEBATIN 121 (Munich 1997).
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schaft),21 as this characterization determines the availability of pass-
through treatment of its profits and losses. A preliminary issue, beyond
those involved in the 1930 decision, is consideration of the possibility that
the tax treatment may depend on the role of the (in this regard, typical)
Germany-United States Treaty for the Avoidance of Double Taxation.
The Treaty, however, focuses on the right of a legal person incorporated
in State A to bring a Treaty-based suit in State B to challenge its tax
treatment there. 22 This Treaty-based right does not carry its home juris-
diction's characterization of the entity into the host jurisdiction for the
purpose of determining its local tax treatment. 23 As an official bulletin of
the German Ministry of Finance (technically only a "Letter" for the gui-
dance of the tax authorities) makes clear, this depends on the domestic
law of the taxing jurisdiction.24 Within this framework pursuant to the
private international law of the Federal Republic, however, only the first
step has been taken. The interesting question concerns the German sub-
stantive law.
And with this we come to the revival of the abandoned IRS Regula-
tions abroad. Based on the jurisprudence concerning comparison of legal
typologies, the Letter specifies the following criteria as determinative:
1) Centralization of Management (and of Representation):
An associational attribute is found whenever one or more persons-
but not all members-are permanently ["auf Dauer"] exclusively au-
thorized to make all decisions necessary to accomplish the purposes
of the entity without the agreement of all (or the other) members.25
The document goes into considerable detail on this point. For example,
it specifies that the (non-associational) attribute is not lost even if some
portion of the members is excluded from participating in management, so
long as the company-"as in the case of a [German] limited partner-
21. For the same purpose, the discussion also treats the German branch establishment
(Betriebssttte) as a U.S. LLC.
22. As applied to a Florida corporation bringing suit in Germany pursuant to Art.
XXV(5) of the Double Tax Convention (in its 1954 version), see Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
[Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 29, 2003 (Ger.), available at http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.
de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=Oc7ecee68ea5e2247
4f04c3582d9ee&nr=25663&pos=0&anz=l.
23. Though the Department of the Treasury early and appropriately accepted that the
local law of the foreign jurisdiction "must be applied in determining the legal relationships
of the members of the organization among themselves ...." Rev. Rul. 73-254, 1973-1 C.B.
613.
24. Steuerliche Einordnung der nach dem Recht der Bundesstaaten der USA
gegrOndeten Limited Liability Company [The Tax Characterization of a Limited Liability
Company Founded Pursuant to the Law[s] of the Federal States of the USA], BMF
Schreiben 19.3.2004, IV B 4 -S 1301 USA - 22/04 [Federal Ministry of Finance, Letter of
March 19, 2004], available at https:/Ibeck-online.beck.de/Default [hereinafter Federal Min-
istry of Finance Letter].
These Letters derive from the complex legal system concerning the division of fiscal
receipts among the Federal and Lander governments pursuant to Articles 85 and 108 of the
German Basic Law ["Constitution"]. They are primarily intended to assure uniform admin-
istration of these laws by the LAnder, but are instructive to the private sector.
25. d.
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ship"-is run by managing members only in their capacity as members
and not in their capacity as appointed or elected managers.26
2) Limited Liability
This was the simplest criterion to state and utilize. The Letter found
this attribute present when none of the members were personally liable
for the debts of or claims against the entity.
3) Transferability of Membership Interests
Putting aside this straightforward issue of members' personal liability,
the second major discussion of the availability of flow-through treatment
under the German law concerns the transferability of membership units.
Interesting for present purposes was the fact-specific view of the Finance
Ministry:
The free transferability of the units exists if the applicable statutory
rules or on the basis of the membership agreement the financial and
membership rights27 arising out of participation can be transferred to
third parties without the consent of the other partners, so that the
acquirer enters into the partner position of the transferor. Free trans-
ferability, on the contrary, does not exist if the agreement of all or
specified partners is needed for the transfer.28
4) Continuity of Life
The characteristic of continuity of life causes the German "ruling"
some difficulties, principally because in the case of the closest analogous
organization of the German law, the Commercial Partnership [Personen-
handelsgesellschaft], whose members enjoy the pass-through privilege, the
death, resignation, or insolvency of a member since a 1998 reform no
longer leads to the dissolution of the entity.29 "This criterion therefore is
only of limited use in the characterization; that is, only when either under
the foreign law or the partnership agreement its life continuation is lim-
ited .... ",30
26. Id. A difficult concept to track onto the U.S. approach, although the treatment of
the limited partner who in her capacity as the owner or director of a corporate general
partner manages the limited partnership is a classic issue. Compare Frigidaire Sales Corp.
v. Union Properties, 562 P.2d 244 (Wash. 1977), with Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526
S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
27. Emphasis added. "Membership rights" basically involve voting rights.
28. Federal Ministry of Finance Letter, supra note 24, at 4. The differences from the
original Kintner language are not major but still worth noting:
[The corporate characteristic exists] if each of its members or those members
owning substantially all of the interests in the organization have the power,
without the consent of other members, to substitute [a third party). In order
for this power of substitution to exist.., the member must be able, without
the consent of other members, to confer upon his substitute all the attributes
of his interest ....
26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1983). Thus, an assignment of the right to profits does not
create associational status as to this element.
29. Federal Ministry of Finance Letter, supra note 24, at 4 (citing § 131 of the German
Commercial Code).
30. Id. The Letter goes on to state:
The unlimited life of the entity is present if, though the foreign statute pro-
vides for its dissolution on these or similar grounds, the members may de-
2015]
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The Letter, however, does not give any weight to the existence or non-
existence of the legal personality of the entity under its (foreign) law of
organization, nor does the number of members matter. 31
A Commentary to the Letter, appended to its publication, 32 suggests a
number of difficulties with this fact-specific approach. Above all, its ap-
plication to the LLC requires individualized review on the basis of the
specified criteria.33 This may not be the case if other organizational forms
are at issue, since these are resolved on the level of that specific form
alone and do not give rise to this particularized treatment. On the other
hand, the Commentary suggests, the ability of the home entity to choose
the availability of flow-through treatment through choosing the organiza-
tional form may in time create the problem that the German tax authori-
ties will prefer a similar individualized analysis with all its practical
consequences in all cases.34
B. THE U.S. MEMBER OF A GERMAN TAX-TRANSPARENT ENTITY
The Commentary also provides a helpful guide to the often-raised issue
of whether the Double Tax Convention has a role to play. The Ministry
Letter itself briefly speaks to this question in dicta that concern the re-
verse situation; namely, the case of a U.S. LLC receiving German source
income, where the typical issue, of course, is the question of who is the
U.S. subject-the organizational entity or its individual owners. The Con-
vention, so the Finance Ministry, requires that the LLC be domiciled in
the United States ["eine in den USA ansassige Person"] if it is to have
access to the benefits of the Convention.35 However, the LLC's "citizen-
ship" or domicile is not the basis of its access to the Convention's benefits
if-though in the U.S. treated as a taxable entity-under German law it
spite these grounds agree to its continuation and this continuation already is
provided for in its agreement from the start and without further considera-
tions. The condition of limited life assumes that in the case of a [statutory]
basis for dissolution the continuation of the entity depends on a separately
[i.e., ex post] reached agreement of the remaining members. It suffices for
this assumption [of limited life] if the foreign law or the membership agree-
ment specifies only a single event as the ground for dissolution. If realisti-
cally, however, such an event is not expectable, it is not to be recognized as a
ground for dissolution.
Id.
31. The second point, concerning the number of members, is the consequence of an en
banc judgment of the Federal Supreme Financial Court, see Bundesfinanzhof [BFH] [Fed-
eral Tax Court] June 25, 1984, SAMMLUNG DER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN UND GUTACHTEN DES
BUNDESFINANZHOFS [BFHE] 405, 1985 (Ger.). This leading case distinguishes the securi-
ties-regulation aspects of a public entity with many passive members from its tax aspects
and grants flow-through status even to these members. It does so on formal organizational
structure grounds that in this context resemble the U.S. flow-through treatment for mass/
public limited partnerships and limited liability companies. The differences in the respec-
tive rationales of the two situations, despite similar outcomes, are worth comparative treat-
ment, but not here.
32. "Commentary" to Letter, supra note 24, at 8.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Federal Ministry of Finance Letter, supra note 24.
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would be treated as a Personengesellschaft; i.e., one whose members,
rather than itself, are subject to income taxation.36 The Letter, surpris-
ingly, suggests that in this case it is the domicile of the LLC's members
that determines the availability of Convention treatment.37 The Com-
mentary convincingly argues that this seems to contradict the purpose of
the Convention, since it is clear that U.S. law taxes the entity on its distri-
butions based on its membership in the tax-transparent German entity.38
It therefore should follow that it itself is a U.S.-based person and as such
should enjoy the benefits of the Convention.
In any event, as it happens, a number of higher and lower German tax
courts since then have agreed with this criticism and treated the U.S. en-
tity as the U.S. subject with standing to claim these Convention benefits.
Most significantly, since the mutual acceptance of the 2006 Protocol to
the U.S.-German Double Tax Convention, 39 the new Article 1(7) has
been used in conjunction with Article 10 in the case of a U.S. S corpora-
tion to reduce the German withholding tax on the dividend received by
that entity to five percent (a rate not available to individuals). 40 It follows
that any entity permitted to choose transparent status conveys the bene-
fits of pass-through status to its members so far as the German withhold-
ing tax is concerned, possibly whether or not they themselves are U.S.
subjects.
C. U.S. TAX TREATMENT OF TH U.S. MEMBER OF A TAX-
TRANSPARENT GERMAN ENTITY
With this, we reach the relevant regulation under IRC § 7701, which I
approach in the context of the evolution from the Kintner Regulations to
the check-the-box approach.
As it happens, the German entity that provides the best case study, the
company with limited liability, the Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung
or GmbH, tracks that evolution. In 1977 the Internal Revenue Commis-
sion issued a Revenue Ruling that considered the transparency of a Ger-
36. Id.
37. Id. In any event, this statement presumably is no longer operative in light of the
Treaty changes referenced infra note 40.
38. "Commentary" to Letter, supra note 24, at 8.
39. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-07, EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TO THE INCOME
TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY (2007).
40. See Bundesfinanzhof [BFH] [Federal Tax Court] June 26, 2013, (Ger.), available at
http://www.bundesfinanzhof.de/entscheidungen/entscheidungen-online. In this case, the
German Supreme Finance Court (BFH) ordered the application of this reduced rate be-
cause under German law this entity was characterized as a corporation and, as such, as-
sumed (again under the law) to be the taxable entity. The fact that in the United States it is
a transparent entity whose individual owners bear the incidents of income taxation did not
concern the court, so long as someone subject to U.S. law was taxed. In other words, the
unavailability of the low rate to individuals, under the Treaty, could be legitimately circum-
vented. See Friedhelm Jacob & Martin Klein, S-Corporation die Zweite - Kernaussagen
und Folgewirkungen des BFH-Urteils vom 26.6.2013, I R 48/12, INTERNATIONALES STEUER-
REcHT [IStR] no. 4, 121 (2014) (Ger.).
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man GmbH owned by two subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation.41 That
Ruling first accepted that limited owner liability was a given under the
German statute. 42 It then examined the particular company's Memoran-
dum of Association, which purported to limit transferability of interests,
but then used the reality of the ownership division of the two members-
90%/10%-to conclude that whatever the Memorandum provided, the
majority member had the power to arrange that free transferability. 43 It
took a similar approach to the continuity of life criterion. 44 The Memo-
randum provided a boilerplate list of events that would cause dissolution
of the company,45 but again the ruling looked to economic reality:
[The dissolution provision] has significance only if there exist sepa-
rate interests that could compel dissolution ... upon the occurrence
of one of the listed events . . . . If, as in the instant case, both
quotaholders are wholly owned by the same corporate parent, there
are no separate interests that could compel dissolution .... Thus, the
statement in the memorandum.. . has no substantive effect and will
be disregarded. 46
The GmbH reappeared in a 1993 ruling,47 which still used the Kintner
Regulations as the metric to evaluate the entity's associational attributes
but specifically retreated from the "economic reality" gloss of the earlier
ruling. The only consequence, however, was to remove the associational
attribute of continuity of life:
It subsequently has been determined that the presence or absence of
separate interests is not relevant to the determination of whether an
entity possesses continuity of life. Because the memorandum of asso-
ciation requires dissolution upon the bankruptcy of either
quotaholder, without further action, the GmbH lacks continuity of
life. 48
With this we reach the relevant regulation under IRC § 7701, which I
approach in the context of the evolution from the Kintner Regulations to
the check-the-box approach. I begin with the purely domestic context,
and then turn to the transnational context.
§ 301.7701-2 Business entities; definitions.
(a) Business entities. For purposes of this section and § 301.7701-3, a
business entity is any entity recognized for federal tax purposes (in-




45. Id. Dropping standard clauses into an agreement can have its own pleasures. In
this case, insanity of a corporate owner was listed as one ground of dissolution.
46. Id.
47. Rev. Rul. 93-4, 1993-1 C.B. 225.
48. Id. This focus on the member's bankruptcy of course is a major element in U.S.
partnership law provisions concerning dissolution, though not in the case of the LLC; nor
even in the former case is it more than a default provision. Since the GmbH Memorandum
at issue, however, mandated dissolution in that event, the characterization of this attribute
as non-associational is appropriate.
(Vol. 68
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cluding an entity with a single owner that may be disregarded as an
entity separate from its owner) .... A business entity with two or
more members is classified for federal tax purposes as either a corpo-
ration or a partnership. A business entity with only one owner is clas-
sified as a corporation or is disregarded; if the entity is disregarded,
its activities are treated in the same manner as a sole proprietorship,
branch, or division of the owner.
(I ) Corporations. For federal tax purposes, the term corporation
means-
(1) A business entity organized under a Federal or State statute ....
(8) Certain foreign entities-
(i) In general .... [T]he following business entities formed in the
following jurisdictions:
Germany, Aktiengesellschaft [stock corporation]
(c) Other business entities. For federal tax purposes-
(1) The term partnership means a business entity that is not a corpo-
ration under paragraph (b) of this section and that has at least
two members.
(2) Wholly owned entities-
(i) In general.... [A] business entity that has a single owner and is
not a corporation under paragraph (b) of this section is disregarded
as an entity separate from its owner.49
The international conflict of laws principle underlying this substantive
statement is the same as in the discussed reverse case: the local law of the
taxing jurisdiction determines the entity's-or its owners'-taxable sta-
tus. It is that substantive law that differs. Unlike-totally unlike-the
German tax treatment already discussed, 5° this section provides a cate-
gorical exemption from associational status and its tax consequences. The
exemption is not based on contractual or other factual specificities; the
label alone suffices to grant its owners flow-through status.
In the context of the present discussion, the upshot of this complex
phrasing is that not only a German Personengesellschaft-including a lim-
ited partnership (as the term is used in the German Letter paraphrased
above) or other formal type-is characterized under U.S. tax law as tax-
transparent.51 The flow-through status also applies to a standard (Ger-
49. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (2014) (emphasis added). The many elisions are of mate-
rial not relevant to this discussion.
50. Recall the introductory statement of the Letter:
For the purposes of its German tax treatment, the limited liability company
may be characterized either as an independent structure subject to the corpo-
rate income tax or as a partnership.
"Commentary" to Letter, supra note 24.
51. The German terminology typically speaks of three types of Personengesellschaften
(in addition to the already mentioned Personenhandelsgesellschaft, supra text accompany-
ing note 21); namely, the general partnership not necessarily for profit (Gesellschaft
brgerlichen Rechts), the commercial general partnership (offene Handelsgesellschaft), and
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man) limited partnership, a Kommanditgesellschaft.52 It even applies to a
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien-essentially a corporation but one
with an individual or corporate 53 general partner, who, pursuant to a spe-
cial provision in the German tax law, enjoys flow-through status (though
the KGaA shareholders do not) despite the fact that depending on the
entity's charter those shares may be sold or otherwise transferred. Most
significantly, it applies to the traditional GmbH.
The GmbH often has been understood in the United States as the func-
tional equivalent of the so-called "close corporation" (whether in its com-
mon law or statutory form), but that equivalency is misleading.5 4 For
many of these entities-even though in the aggregate they constitute only
a small percentage of all so organized-centralized management, con-
tinuity of enterprise, and limited liability are the norm; only transferabil-
ity of interests remains difficult to achieve. While in formal terms that
characteristic is the default option under the German statute, it is there
hedged with some significant constraints.55 In practical terms, it usually is
contractually limited at least in the case of the equivalent of the close
corporation. Whether such limitations are absent or relaxed for the
GmbH with large numbers of members, however, is an empirical ques-
tion on which to the best of my knowledge reliable data are not availa-
ble.56 And be that as it may, this, in any event, is the only one of the four
critical attributes whose associational status might be questionable.
In conclusion, it is the U.S. characterization that is categorical; the Ger-
man characterization remains fact-intensive (albeit within a formal taxon-
omy of entity structures). That should not be a surprise. Federal law has
completely abandoned the effort to hold the line on some ideal-typical
basis of deserving versus undeserving flow-through benefits to passive in-
the limited partnership, which, depending on the preferred typology, may include the lim-
ited partnership proper (the Kommanditgesellschaft), the special German entity known as
the Kommanditgesellschaft aufAktien [KGaA]) described immediately below, and the par-
ticipation as silent partner in another's ownership of a commercial enterprise (stille Gesell-
schaft/er, see Lipp, supra note 14). Despite the partnership-like characterization of the
GmbH created by negative inference in the cited IRC regulation, the German typology
does not consider it to be part of this non-corporate set.
52. Since this is a type of Personengesellschaft.
53. That a corporation may be the general partner of a KGaA is a relatively recent
concession, now embodied in Einkommensteuergesetz [Income Tax Statute], § 15(1), no. 3
(Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/.
54. For a succinct and clear overview of the German GmbH law, including a transla-
tion of its text, see MEISTER ET AL., THE GERMAN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (7th ed.
2010).
55. See Act on companies with limited liability (Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften
mit beschrankter Haftung, GmbHG) of 20 April 1892 (Federal Law Gazette III 4123-1), as
last amended by Article 27 of the Act of 23 July 2013 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 2586), § 15
(Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de. This Act requires notarial confirma-
tion of transfers. That, as well as the nature of the ownership instrument, makes both ac-
cess to the primary capital markets and trading on the secondary markets infeasible.
56. The standard student text, CHRISTINE WINDBICHLER, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 202
(22d ed. 2009), reports that more than 1,000,000 exist. Thus, even if only as few as two
percent of these are substantial and centrally managed enterprises, see id. at 206, that still
represents a significant occupancy of the economy.
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vestors in enterprises, whether these be classic holding companies or ac-
tive operating companies. Some of the momentum for this sea of change
came from policy considerations favoring certain sector-specific invest-
ments; some from political pressure barely hidden under policy argu-
ments; some from the drag on stock market performance caused by the
double taxation of corporate profits and dividends (though that itself has
been reduced significantly in recent years); and some from difficulties of
administration of rules increasingly out of sync with investment practices.
The fact that German, indeed general European, tax policy has not
(yet) converged on the U.S. system also has underlying economic rea-
sons. 57 German individual as well as institutional investors have not yet
generated the high (i.e., U.S.) level of surplus savings prepared to enter
these channels of investment directly through the second and especially
the third pillar of retirement-driven investment vehicles. That was the
case a quarter of a century ago58 and remains, though to a diminishing
extent, the case today. As a result, whatever other policy grounds may
have existed to move the U.S. authorities away from the Kintner ap-
proach, the investor-driven demand for pass-through treatment has not
reached the level at which German tax policy in this field needs
reconsideration.
57. This statement, and indeed this paragraph, need some qualification. Some states,
largely of the UK and Commonwealth cohort, accept the U.S. grant of tax transparency to
domestic entity forms other than the corporate one without recharacterizing these in the
German manner. The following quotation illustrates this point:
Australian domestic law starts with the presumption that corporate limited
partnerships are the proper taxpayer rather than the partners in the partner-
ship and that all "companies" are taxpayers in their own right. However,
being aware that the United Kingdom treats the partners in limited partner-
ships as the taxpayer, Australia defers to the UK classification. Similarly,
aware that the United States treats a company created as a limited liability
company (LLC) as a partnership rather than as a company, Australia defers
to the US classification.
Cooper, supra note 12 (citations omitted).
58. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Com-
parative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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